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a.k.a. FANNIE MAE, a corp.
created by Congress of the United
States

)
)
)
)
)
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)
)
vs.
)
David B. Allen, an individual; and )
DOES I through X, unknown
)
occupants of the property commonly)
knows as 1596 E. Shingle Mill
)
Road, Sandpoint, Bonner County, )
Idaho.
)
)
Defendants/Appellants. )

Sup.Ct. No. 37972-2010
Bonner Case No. CV-2009-1865
REPLY BRIEF

---------~--)
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
THE HONORABLE STEVEN YERBY PRESIDING
Attorney For Appellant:

Mr. David Bruce Allen
In Properia Persona
222 Kootenai Fourth Avenue
Sandpoint, near [83 864]
State of Idaho

Attorney of Respondents:

Mark D. Pierson
MARK D. PIERSON, P.A.
314 South 9th Street, Suite 3 00
Post Office Box 657 5
Boise, near [83707-6575]
State of Idaho
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I.

What is not in Dispute.

With no response by Respondent by the only Attorney who might have
standing in the above entitled case, Mr. Pierson, is silent by the record. Then, the
first interloper on the case, Mr. O'Neill of O'Neill Law Firm trespasses on the case
with acknowledged approval of two (2) District Court Judges.
It is a fact that Mr. O'Neill is not of the Law firm of Routh, Crabtree and

Olson. It is a fact that Routh, Crabtree and Olson is not an Idaho Law Firm, nor
ar'e they registered with the Bar of this state. It is also a fact that Mr. O'Neill serves
as the registered agent for Routh, Crabtree and Olson to exclusively accept service
of process for them in this state. Appellant believes that a fraud upon the Court has
been committed by Mr. O'Neill concerning his affiliation with Routh, Crabtree,
and Olson, who has no standing in any Court in this State.
Over the objection of the Appellant, One judge who had no approval by
Order of this Court to act as required by law to act in this case and the other, the
assigned presiding judge, seemingly by the record did not want to perform his
duties as required by law. Appellant use of the term "law" is as defined in the Code
of Judicial Conduct.
All decisions made were devoid of being in compliance with the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 (b) and case law decisions by this Court on the
subject matter of attorney substitution all requiring strict compliance with the
Rules of Court. Such determinations were not acts of discretion and were
erroneous upon its face in defiance with the rule of law in this state.
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Further such acts were prejudicial and detrimental to the Appellant and in
violation of Sections 1 and 18 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Idaho
and the due process and equal protections clauses of the Constitution of the United
States of America.
Now it seems that Mr. O'Neill has enticed his fledgling, Mr. Langford, to
continue in his stead without substitution being properly done either in accordance
with Rule ll(b) of the I.R.C.P. and the Appellant objects to Mr. Langford tal<lng
any action in the above entitled case without proper substitution being in place. All
of these acts and actions demonstrates the Appellant's veracity concerning the fact
Appellant was not properly noticed in the first attempted substitution is more
probable than a lawful and proper substitution of counsel occurred in this case.
Appellant now asks this Court to properly strike all filings of Mr. Langford
sua sponte and to grant the relief in the pending Motion to Augment.
These facts as stated in the Statement of the Case in Appellant's Opening
Brief as well as the argument therein are not in dispute and are acquiesced by
Respondent's silence on the record concerning all issues on appeal including costs
on appeal and also the challenge to the constitutionality of the Non-judicial
Foreclosure Act in chapter 15 of Title 45 Idaho Code.
Appellant objects to Mr. Langford's Brief for lack of standing without
IRCP Rule l l(B) procedures for substitution of counsel having being met and Mr.
O'Neill does not have standing for the same reason.
Therefore, Langford's brief should be struck sua sponte.
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II.

Notice was NOT Served Upon Appellant as Required
Under chapter 15 of Title 45 Idaho Code - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act
But the most important point not addressed by Respondent and asserted by

the Appellant throughout these proceedings was that Appellant did not get service
of notice of the sale and for that matter most of the requirements of due process
under chapter 15 of Title 45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act. This Court has
determined in Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137
P.3d 429 (Idaho 2006) 1, that strict compliance with notice provisions is required in
foreclosure of Deeds of trusts citing Security Pacific Finance Corp v. Bishop, 109
Idaho 25 at 28, 704 P.2d 357 at 360 (Idaho.App. 1985) in Note 1 of Federal

Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 P.3d 429 at 143 Idaho
46, 137 P.3d 433 (Idaho 2006).
Further this Court has previously rejected the argument brought by Mr.
O'Neill, even if he has standing, that even if Appellant did not receive the proper
statutory requirements of notice under 15 of Title 45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure
Act that the sale is final under the provisions of LC. §§ 45-1508 and 45-1510. By
raising this issue the Respondent admitted that they knew of the notice
requirements in other provisions of 15 of Title 45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act.
See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 P.3d 429 at

I

That this case cite is the same cite as Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,
Fannie Mae, v. Gary R. and Linda L. Appel, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No.
31760, 2006 Opinion No. 61, in the Opening Brief by Appellant. It should also
be noted that Bonner County is the only county in this State which does nqt
allow litigants access of law library materials.
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143 Idaho 46-7, 137 P.3d 433-4 (Idaho 2006).
Mr. O'Neill clearly admitted at the April 2l51· 2011 hearing that the notice
requirements were not met. See Transcript of the Hearing of April 21st, 2011 and
is incorporated herein by its reference. In Appellant's Opening Brief Appellant the
specific conversation that Judge Verby and Mr. O'Neill had pertaining to the lack
of notice Appellant did not receive as required by 15 of Title 45 - Non-judicial
Foreclosure Act.

It was a lack of discretion by Judge Verby after learning of the lack of
notice to Appellant and that Appellant did not receive notice as required under 15
of Title 45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act coupled with Appellant giving Judge
Verby notice of this Court's recent opinion of Federal Home Loan Mortgage

Cmp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 PJd 429 (Idaho 2006) in providing adequate
protections to Appellant's rights in property under Section 1 and 18 of Article 1 of
the Constitution of the State of Idaho and the due process clauses under the State
and National Constitutions.
III.

Real Party in Interest.

It is pointed out in the case of Security Pacific Finance Corp v. Bishop, I 09
Idaho 25 at 28, 704 P.2d 357 at 360 (Idaho.App. 1985) that "lenders must strictly
comply with the Deed of Trust statutes, and the statutes and Deed of Trust must be
strictly construed in favor of of the borrower." citing Patton v. First Federal

Savings & Loan Ass'n of Phoenix, 118 Ariz. 473,578 P.2d 152, 156 (1978). See
Note 1 in Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 PJd

Page 4 of 11
Appellant's Reply Brief

429 (Idaho 2006).
Recently across this nation courts are rejecting the notion that MERS can
act as beneficiary and nominee at the same time, because MERS admits that they
are nothing more than a national electronic registration and tracking system that
tracks the beneficial ownership interests and serving rights in mortgage loans. See
addendum 1

In re Mitchell, Memorandum Opinion from the United States

Bankruptcy Court District of Nevada on March 31st, 2009 and is incorporated
herein by its reference.
Appellant requests this Court to TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE of addendum
1 - In re Mitchell, Memorandum Opinion from the United States Bankruptcy
Court District of Nevada on March 31st, 2009.
Appellant tried to explain to Judges Hosack and Yerby that MERS could
not pass beneficial interests to SunTrust Mortgage, which started the chain of lack
of standing to the Respondent.
Coupled with the fact that the original promissory note had been already
sold in the open market by Panhandle State Bank, the loan originator, MERS did
not have possession of the Original Wet Ink Promissory Note, nor could each
alleged successor in interest have a complete instrument to each subsequent
supposed purchaser of the promissory note and Deed of Trust. See addendum 1 -

In re Mitchell, Memorandum Opinion from the United States Bankruptcy Court
District of Nevada on March 31st, 2009 page 8 which states to wit:
"For there to be a valid assignment for purposes of foreclosure both
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the note and deed of trust must be assigned. A mortgage loan
consists of a promissory note and a security instrument, typically a
mortgage or a deed of trust. When the note is split from the deed of
trust, 'the note becomes, as a practical matter, unsecured.'
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES)§ 5.4
99 cmt. a (1997). A person holding only a note lacks power to
foreclose because it lacks the security, and a person holding only a
deed of trust suffers no default because only the holder of the note
is entitled to payment on it. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 5.4 99 cmt. e (1997). 'Where the
mortgage has 'transferred' only the mortgage the transaction is a
nullity and his 'assignee,' having received

no interest in the

underlying debt or obligation, has a worthless piece of paper.' 4
RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PRPERTY, §
37.27[2] (2000)."
Also, constructive fraud and or fraud in the factum from the inception is
also alleged by the Appellant, which Appellant has never been given an
opportunity to present his case-in-chief, which is part of his meritorious defenses
in answer to Plaintiffs complaint.
In this case Sun Trust Mortgage purchased an incomplete instrument from
Panhandle State Bank or MERS, who could not pass title due to their lack of
standing to convey, sell, or otherwise transfer title in the first instance and
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secondly with the lack of the complete instrument comprising of the original
promissory note and Deed of Trust being kept together.
Where real party-in-interest status has been made mandatory by statute or
rule, as it has in Idaho, real-party-in-interest status must be demonstrated before a
suit can proceed. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254 at 258,
230 P.3d 1073 at 1077 (Idaho 2009), which was another meritorious defense raised
in answer to Plaintiffs complaint, as well as raised orally at each hearing. See
transcripts of March 171\ 2011, pages 26 - 28, April 21 si, 2011 pages 8 - 11 and 16
-22, and 24

27, July 21st, 2011 pages 6 - 8.

All these meritorious defenses raised in answer to Plaintiffs complaint and
under the doctrine of standing required the Court to decide the standing issue
before moving forward which was not done at each stage of the case. This was not
a discretionary act, it is required under rule of law and in error was not done.
Respondent having not alleged or demonstrated having the original wet-ink
promissory note gives Respondent no standing in this case to foreclose on the
property owned by the Appellant. This is also true for Suntrust Mortgage, Just
Law, Inc., MERS or Panhandle State Bank. Appellant asserted to the trial court for
Respondent to produce the original wet-ink promissory note and the court failed to
order the Respondent to produce the original wet-ink promissory note to prove
standing and was a denial of due process and was an abuse of discretion in
violation of IRCP Rule 17(a) which requires a cause to be brought in the name of
the real party-in-interest.
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Any purported deed issued by and/or for Suntrust Mortgage is a forged and
or fraudulent deed for the reasons as stated above and if they should provide it to
the court would also be a fraud upon the court.
Any purported deed issued deed to Respondent, which is nothing more
than a deed to Suntrust Mortgage is another forged and or fraudulent deed for the
reasons as stated above, as well as, it was a deed which actually purports to deed
title to the Respondent but uses Suntrust's address, and if they should provide it to
the court would also be a fraud upon the court.
Any purported deed issued by and for Suntruat Mortgage was done in
derogation to

15 of Title 45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act as Appellant

emphasizes once again was not provided notice as required under 15 of Title

45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act and as such all deeds issued after Appellant's
Deed are null and void. See addendum 1 - In re Mitchell, Memorandum Opinion
from the United States Bankruptcy Court District of Nevada on March 31 si, 2009.
Based upon the record it is clearly, palpably and inherently false that
Respondent is the "real-party-in-interest" in the above entitled case, unless they
can demonstrate that they have possession of the original wet-ink promissory note
and deed of trust. Notices of Demand were sent to each lending institution and
requests were made to Just Law, Inc., and the Respondent to produce the original
wet-ink promissory note to prove that they were the holder in due course and each
party failed to do so and by their acquiescence of silence to even respond.
Respondent does not have the original wet-ink promissory note and therefore has
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no standing.

IV.

Constitutionality of 15 of Title 45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act
If not for any other reason and as demonstrated across the nation many

people being foreclosed such as in the case of the Appellant under chapter 15 of
Title 45 - Non-judicial Foreclosure Act is unconstitutional because the act failed to
provide adequate protection to the Appellant and others in the same position as
Appellant from unscrupulous supposed lenders and banking institutions.

V.

Conclusion
Mr. Pierson was the originator of the Complaint, who after receiving

Notice of facts surrounding the loan with Panhandle State Bank who sold altered
documents from its original state to Suntrust Mortgage, Mr. Pierson wanted out of
the case. Without properly following the mandatory procedures in the rule on
withdrawing counsel, in which only the Appellant has actual knowledge of facts
did not receive a Notice signed by both Mr. Pierson and Mr. O'Neill. This Court
has stated over-and-over that strict complaince is required. Again, we see noncompliance with this rule by Mr. O'Neill by his attempt to substitute himself with
Mr. Langford a junior in his law firm without proper notice of substitution of
counsel signed by both attorneys. Law firms are not members of the bar or
attorneys and absent a General Power of Attorney from the Respondent has no
standing in the above entitled case.
Looking at the record and the actual document mentioned in Respondnet's
complaint, Many of them were deficient to comply with the Non-judicial
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Foreclosure Act in 45-1506, 45-1506A or Band in fact as admitted by Mr. O'Neill
Appellant did not get served with Notice of Sale prior to the sale, which was done
outside Bonner County, State of Idaho - another violation of the Act.
Other reasons more ominious shows that everybody whose deed is after the
Appellant does not pass title in accordance with the law of the land. Thus being
the case, Respondent, who is really Suntrust Mortgage does not have standing
either.
At a critical strage of the proceeding on the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss,
to be heard in February then being forced into a new hearing date without Notice
and without authority. Then without Notice and without authority another judge
who was not assigned to the case appears and determines the Motion without
standing to do so, leaving the Motion undetermined.
No Adversary, No Counsel, No Judge - and the law, thus far seems to be
non-existant at this point. Judge Yerby decides to finally do the case he was
assigned to and makes multiple procedure errors which affected the outcome of
the case to the Appellant's detriment and prejudice, even though the law was
provided and explained.
Appellant asserts that this Court should reverse adverse decisions made and
the Appellant, accepts your promissory oath and the oaths of all of the officers of
this court. The court is now open.
Dated: October 7th, 2011
David Bruce Allen, In Properfa
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERIFY that on this 7th

day of October, 2011, I lodged for

filing the original bound reply brief, six (6) true and correct bound copies, and one
true and correct unbound, unstapled copy of the foregoing Reply Appellate Brief
with the Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court.
I FURTHER CERTIFY that on the same date, I caused two (2) each true
and correct bound copies of the foregoing Reply Appellate Brief to be served to
each as follows:
Mark D. Pierson
MARK D. PIERSON, P.A.
314 South 9th Street, Suite 300
Post Office Box 6575
Boise, near [83707-6575]
State of Idaho

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Fax'd to:

Courtesy Copies:
Mr. Derrick J. O'Neill and Brian R. Langford
O'Neill Law, PLLC
300 Main Street, Suite 150
Boise, near [83702]
State of Idaho
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[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Fax'd to:

ADDENDUM 1

1

2
3

Entered on Docket
March 31, 2009

4

Hon. Linda B. Riegle
United States Bankruptcy Judge

5
6
7

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
8

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

9

******

10

)
)
)
)
)

In re
11

JOSHUA & STEPHANIE MITCHELL,
12
Debtor(s).
13

14

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)~

Case No. BK-S-07-16226-LBR
Chapter 7

DATE:
TIME:

August 19, 2008
3:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

15
16

Mortgage Electronic Recording Systems, Inc. ("MERS") through various counsel has

17

filed a number of motions to lift stay. 1 Some of the motions were filed in the name of NIERS,

18

while others have been filed in the name of MERS as the nominee for another entity. An order

19

for joint briefing was entered because the substantially same issues were presented in the

20

motions, and a joint hearing was held. Mitchell (#07-16226) has been designated as the lead

21

case. 2 The trustee or counsel for the debtor in these cases has opposed the lift-stay motions on the

22
23
24
25
26

1

Motions have been filed in the following cases: #07-16226, #07-016333, #07-16645,
#07-17577,#07-18851,#08-10427,08-11007,#08-11860,#07-13593,#08-10108,#08-10778,
#08-12255,#07-17468,#08-11245,#08-11608,#08-11668,#08-11725,#08-11819,#08-12206,
#08-12242, #08-12317, #08-12319, #08-10052, #08-10072, #08-10718, #08-11499, #07-16519.
Each of the judges will enter their own orders in the matters that are assigned to them.
2

27
28

The docket numbers mentioned in this opinion are to the Mitchell case unless otherwise

noted.

1

1

grounds of standing and that MERS is not the real party in interest.

2

The initial response filed by MERS contained no evidentiary support. Rather it described

3

the role of MERS and its members by relying on law review articles and the recitation of facts in

4

other cases in other districts involving MERS. Prior to the initial argument, MERS attempted to

5

withdraw the motions filed in all but four of the cases. MERS then filed a declaration at the

6

court's direction explaining why the motions were withdrawn. The declaration of William

7

Hultman was filed in Dart. 3 The declaration, in addition to explaining MERS' rationale for

8

withdrawing the motions, also attached as exhibits copies of the MERS Membership

9

Application, the MERSCorp. Inc. Rules of Membership, the MERS Procedural Manual, and the

10

MERS Terms and Conditions ofMembership. 4 The court also requested appropriate evidentiary

11

support for the allegations concerning the relationship between MERS and the entities for whom

12

the motions were brought. A supplemental declaration was filed in Michell, the lead case. 5

13

As noted, MERS has attempted to withdraw all but four of its original motions, leaving

14

only Dart (#08-11007), Hawkins (#07-13593), Ramirez-Furiati (#08-10427), and Zeigler (#08-

15

10718). MERS admits that it failed to follow its own procedures in the motions it wants to

16

withdraw. 6 The debtor, the chapter 13 trustee, and MERS subsequently stipulated to a lift of stay

17

in Ramirez-Furiati which the court approved with the acknowledgment that the order contained

18

no finding about MERS' standing. 7 This court will discuss the issues raised in the motions that

19
20
21

3

Dart (#08-11007).

4

Docket #4 7 in Dart.

22
5

23
24
25
26
27
28

Docket #74 in Mitchell ("Huntman Declaration"). The Declaration also incorporated the
prior declaration filed by Mr. Hultman in Dart. References in this memorandum to the
declaration filed in Mitchell include the incorporated declaration and the exhibits thereto.
6

Docket #74, Declaration of William Hultman ("Hultman Declaration"), Exhibit 1, pp. 45. "The fact that MERS chose to not go forward on these ... motions was not a determination by
MERS that it does not have standing to move for relief from stay." Exhibit D to that Declaration
sets forth the name of the motions withdrawn and the reason for withdrawal.
7

Docket #54 in #08-10427.
2

1

MERS attempts to withdraw, 8 and by this order issues its ruling in Dart and Hawkins, which are

2

the two cases that are now pending before it. 9

3

The court has advised the parties that it would consider any information contained on the

4

MERS website at http://www.mersinc.org/ unless an objection was made. No objection has been

5

filed by either party. The court thus takes judicial notice of the contents of the MERS website.

6

WHAT IS MERS?

7

MERS is a national electronic registration and tracking system that tracks the

8

beneficial ownership interests and servicing rights in mortgage loans. 10 The MERS website says

9

this:

10

MERS is an innovative process that simplifies the
way mortgage ownership and servicing rights are
originated, sold and tracked. Created by the real
estate finance industry, MERS eliminates the need
to prepare and record assignments when trading
residential and commercial mortgage loans.

11

12
13

William Hultman, Secretary ofMERS, has testified in his Declaration that loans are
14
registered to a "MERS Member" who has entered into the MERS Membership Agreement.
15
MERS Members enter into a contract with MERSCORP to electronically register and track
16

beneficial ownership interests and servicing rights in MERS registered mortgage loans. 11 MERS

17
Members agree to appoint MERS, which MERSCORP wholly owns, to act as their common
18
agent, or nominee, and to name MERS as the lienholder of record in a nominee capacity on all
19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

8

R. BANKR. P. 9014 makes FED. R. BANKR. P. 7041 applicable to contested matters,
which includes lift stay motions, and FED. R. BANKR. P. 7041 incorporates FED. R. Crv. P. 41.
Under these rules, a party can voluntarily dismiss a lift-stay motion without a court order only if
there is a stipulation to dismiss or the dismissal is filed before an opposition is filed, and neither
is true here.
FED.

9

Some cases were added to the argument calendar after the April 29, 2008 joint hearing
order. Separate orders will be entered in each of those cases, which counsel agreed to continue
pending a ruling in the "test case." See Transcript (Docket# 83) pp. 9 and 76.
10

MERS Response, Docket# 49, p. 3.

1

i.'MERS Members" are mortgage lenders and other entities. ("Membership in MERS
Overview," filed with Hultman Declaration, Docket #74.)
3

1

recorded security instruments relating to the loans registered on the MERS System. \\Then a

2

promissory note is sold by the original lender to others, the various sales of the notes are tracked

3

on the MERS System. 12

4
5

Hultman goes on to say in his Declaration that once MERS becomes the beneficiary of
record as nominee, it remains the beneficiary when the beneficial ownership interests in the

6 promissory note or servicing rights are transferred by one MERS Member to another and that it
7

tracks the transfers electronically on the MERS System. So long as the sale of the note involves a

8

member of:VIERS, °YIERS remains the beneficiary of record on the deed of trust and continues to

9

act as nominee for the new beneficial owner. 13

IO

STANDING
MERS must have both constitutional and prudential standing,1 4 and be the real party in

11
12
13

interest under FED. R. CIV. P. 17, 15 in order to be entitled to lift-stay relief.
Constitutional standing under Article III requires, at a minimum, that a party must have

14

suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant's conduct, that the injury be

15

traced to the challenged action, and that it is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Valley

16

Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464,472

17

(1982)(citations and internal quotations omitted).

18

Beyond the Article III requirements of injury in fact, causation, and redressibility, MERS

19

must also have prudential standing, which is judicially-created set of principles that places limits

20

on the class of persons who may invoke the courts' powers. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,

21
22

12

23

13

24

14

25
26

Docket #74, Hultman Declaration at ,r 3.

Docket # 74, Hultman Declaration at~ 4.

The standing doctrine "involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court
jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise." Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128-29
(2004) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975)).
15

27
28

Stay-reliefrequests are governed by FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(a)(l), to which FED. R.
BANKR. P. 9014 is applicable. Rule 9014, in turn, incorporates Rule 7017, which makes FED. R.
CIV. P. 17 applicable ("[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.").
4

1

499 (1975). As a prudential matter, a plaintiff must assert "his own legal interests as the real

2

party in interest," Dunmore v. United States, 358 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9 th Cir. 2004), as found in

3

FED. R. Crv. P. 17, which provides "[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party

4

in interest."

5

MERS' primary contention is that it has standing by virtue of the fact that it was

6

named as the beneficiary under the deeds of trust and that the trustor (the maker of the note)

7

recognized MERS could take actions of the beneficiary or that it is the nominee of the

8

beneficiary. "In non-judicial foreclosure states, [MERS] must at least be the record beneficiary

9

under the Deed of Trust, with the powers expressly set forth therein, including the power of

10

foreclosure; in addition, as noted, it may become the holder on the note under some

11

circumstances. This procedure fully establishes standing under this court's rules and Nevada

12

law." 16 MERS argues in its supplemental brief: "It would be reasonable to hold that a motion that

13

pleads MERS is the of-record beneficiary on the deed of trust is prima facie evidence of standing

14

to move for relief from stay and contains an implied certification that MERS is able to discharge

15

the responsibilities of a movant." 17 MERS states that the issue of standing focuses on who can

16

foreclose and that MERS can foreclose on the properties as a "person authorized to make the sale

17

under the terms of the trust deed. 18 (See also, Transcript, Docket# 83, pp. 14-15.)

18

MERS also argues that it has standing which follows principles set forth in the Uniform

19

Commercial Code that entitle a nominee holder of an instrument to sue to enforce the

20

instrument. 19 It is unclear whether MERS is arguing that it has standing in its own right, or as the

21

agent of the entity entitled to enforce the note, or both. Compare the following arguments, all

22
23
24

16

25

17

26

18

27
28

MERS' Response, Docket #49, p. 9 (emphasis added).

Supplemental Brief of MERS, Docket# 73, p. 10.

Docket #49, p. 10. However, it is not the beneficiary that is authorized to make the sale
under the trust deed, it is the trustee.
19

Docket #49, p. 10.
5

1

made in the same supplemental brief. 20 MERS argues at page 9 of the brief that "this evidence

2

demonstrates MERS right to enforce the note as the note's 'holder."'21 In the same brief, at page

3

8, it argues "[t]his evidence further demonstrates MERS authority to act/or the current beneficial

4

mvner of the loan or its servicer."22 And at page 1 of the brief MERS argues this: "In the motions

5

at issue, MERS is the agent of the original lender and its successors and assigns for defined

6

purposes (such a relationship is termed a 'nominee.')."23

STANDING AS THE NAMED BENEFICIARY OR
THE NOMINEE OF THE BENEFICIARY OR ITS ASSIGNEE

7
8

:WIERS does not have standing merely because it is the alleged beneficiary under the
9

deed of trust. It is not a beneficiary and, in any event, the mere fact that an entity is a named
10
beneficiary of a deed of trust is insufficient to enforce the obligation.

11
The deed of trust attempts to name MERS as both a beneficiary and a nominee. The
12
document first says this:
13
MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee
for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns. MERS is the
beneficiary under this Security Instrurnent. 24

14
15

And later it says this:
16
The beneficiary of this Security Instrument is MERS (solely as
nominee for Lender and Lenders successors and assigns) and the
successors and assigns of MERS. 25

17

18
19
20
21
20

Docket #73.

21

Docket #73, p. 9.

24

22

Docket # 73, p. 8. (Emphasis added.)

25

23

Docket #73, p. 1.

26

24

22
23

27

28

1n re Mitchell, #07-16226, Motion to Lift Stay (Docket# 30), Exhibit B, p. 2, Subpart

(E).
25

In re Mitchell, #07-16226, Motion to Lift Stay (Docket# 30), Exhibit B, p. 3.
6

MERS' "Terms and Conditions"26 identifies MERS' interests. The Terms and Conditions

1

2 say this:
MERS shall serve as mortgagee of record with respect to all such
mortgage loans solely as a nominee, in an administrative
capacity, for the beneficial owner or owners thereoffrom time to
time. MERS shall have no rights whatsoever to any payments
made on account of such mortgage loans, to any servicing rights
related to such mortgage loans, or to any mortgaged properties
securing such mortgage loans. MERS agrees not to assert any
rights (other than rights specified in the Governing Documents)
with respect to such mortgage loans or mortgaged properties.
References herein to "mortgage(s)" and "mortgagee ofrecord"
shall include deed(s) of trust and beneficiary under a deed of trust
and any other form of security instrument under applicable state
law.

3

4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(Emphasis added.)

A "beneficiary" is defined as "one designated to benefit from an appointment,

11
12

disposition, or assignment ... or to receive something as a result of a legal arrangement or

13

instrument." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (8 th ed. 2004). But it is obvious from the MERS'

14

"Terms and Conditions" that MERS is not a beneficiary as it has no rights whatsoever to any

15

payments, to any servicing rights, or to any of the properties secured by the loans. To reverse an

16

old adage, if it doesn't walk like a duck, talk like a duck, and quack like a duck, then it's not a

17

duck. 27

18
19
20

But more importantly, even if MERS is the nominee of the beneficiary, or the motion was
brought by the beneficiary, that mere allegation is not sufficient to confer standing.
Under Nevada law a negotiable promissory note 28 is enforceable by: (1) the holder 9 of the

21

22
23

"MERS Terms and Conditions" filed in Dart (#08-11007) at ,r 2, Docket #47-7.
(Emphasis added.)
26

27

24
25
26
27
28

The court is aware of at least one case in this district, Elias v. Homeeq Serv., 2009 WL
481270 (D. Nev. 2009)(slip copy), in which MERS has been found to have standing to foreclose
as a nominee beneficiary of a deed of trust. While the court in Elias found the deeds of trust,
notices of foreclosure, and the trustee's deed upon sale established MERS' standing, there is
nothing in the opinion to suggest that MERS lacked possession of the notes.
28

The court assumes, without deciding, that the notes in question are negotiable
instruments. If they aren't, then custom and practice will treat them as if they are. For example,
7

1

note, or (2) a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder. 30 Thus if MERS

2

is not the holder of the note, then to enforce it MERS must be a transferee in possession who is

3

entitled to the rights of a holder or have authority under state law to act for the holder. Simply

4

being a beneficiary or having an assignment of a deed of trust is not enough to be entitled to

5

foreclose on a deed of trust. For there to be a valid assignment for purposes of foreclosure both

6

the note and the deed of trust must be assigned. A mortgage loan consists of a promissory note

7

and a security instrument, typically a mortgage or a deed of trust. 31 When the note is split from

8

the deed of trust, "the note becomes, as a practical matter, unsecured." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

9

PROPERTY (MORTGAGES)§ 5.4 cmt. a (1997). A person holding only a note lacks the power to

10

foreclose because it lacks the security, and a person holding only a deed of trust suffers no

11

default because only the holder of the note is entitled to payment on it. See RESTATEMENT

12

(THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES)§ 5.4 cmt. e (1997). "Where the mortgagee has

13

'transferred' only the mortgage, the transaction is a nullity and his 'assignee,' having received no

14

interest in the underlying debt or obligation, has a worthless piece of paper." 4 RICHARD R.

15

POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY,§ 37.27[2] (2000).

16

Given this, it is troubling that MERS apparently believes that in states such as Nevada

17
18
19
20
21

under N.R.S. § 104.9012(tt), Nevada's Article 9, an "instrument" is defined as a negotiable
instrument, "or any other writing that evidences a right to the payment of a monetary
obligation ... and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with
any necessary endorsement or assignment." "Instruments" are thus defined somewhat broadly
according to ordinary business practices.

22
29

23
24
25
26

A "holder" is the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either
to a bearer or to an identified person who has possession. N.R.S. § 104.1201 (u)
30

N.R.S. § 104.3301. A negotiable promissory is also enforceable under N.R.S.
§ 104.3301 (c) by a nonholder of a note that has been stolen, destroyed, or paid by mistake. There
has been no allegation in this case making this provision relevant here.
31

27

28

Nevada recognizes that parties may secure the performance of an obligation or the
payment of a debt by means of a deed of trust. N.R.S. § 107.020. The maker of the note is the
trustor and the payee is the beneficiary.
8

1

possession of the note is not required if no deficiency is sought. 32 Hultman says this in his

2

declaration:

In non-judicial foreclosure states, if the Member chooses to have
MERS foreclose under the power of sale provision in the security
instrument and is not seeking a deficiency judgment, then the note
does not need to be in the possession of the Member's MERS
Certifying Officer when commencing the foreclosure action;
provided, however, that under no circumstances may the Member
allege that the note is in MERS possession and seek enforcement
of the note unless MERS actually possesses the note. 33

3
4
5
6
7

This distinction between judicial and non-judicial foreclosure states, or deficiency and
8
non-deficiency ones, is one which MERS has designed out of whole cloth. In order to foreclose,
9

MERS must establish there has been a sufficient transfer of both the note and deed of trust, or
10
that it has authority under state law to act for the note's holder. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
11
PROPERTY (MORTGAGES)§ 5.4 cmt. c (1997). See also, In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 516-17
12
(Bankr. C.D. Calif. 2008).

13
14

DOES MERS HA VE STANDING AS THE AGENT OF
THE MEMBER OR IN ITS OWN RIGHT?

15

The mere statement that the movant is a member of MERS does nothing but lay the

16

groundwork for agency. In order to enforce rights as the agent of the holder, MERS must

17

establish that its principal is entitled to enforce the note. Motions brought by MERS as nominee

18

could meet the threshold test of standing, and MERS might be the "real party in interest" under

19

FED. R. Crv. P. 17, if MERS is the actual nominee of the present Member who is entitled to

20

enforce the note. Under Rule 17 a party in interest is any party to whom the relevant substantive

21

law grants a cause of action. U-Haul Int'!, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1038 (9 th Cir.

22

1986). Counsel for MERS acknowledged during oral argument that MERS is the agent for its

23
24
25
26
27
28

32

Despite MERS' contention that the mere status as a beneficiary or nominee of a
beneficiary is sufficient, MERS has tried to withdraw most of its motions because it could not
ascertain that its Member had possession of the note when the motion was filed. See Hultman
Declaration at p. 4, Docket #74; Docket #49 at p.11; and Docket #47, Exhibit Din Dart).
33

Hultman Declaration, Docket #74, ,r 4.
9

1

members only. 34 If a note has been transferred to a non-member, then MERS cannot act as the

2

agent. One cannot assume that just because MERS was named as the initial nominee in the deed

3

of trust that it still retains that relationship with the holder of the note. Moreover, by virtue of the

4

fact that some of the motions were filed even after the note was transferred out of the MERS

5

system, it is apparent that MERS has not tracked (or been appropriately advised of) the

6

assignment of the note to a non-member. For example in Moore,35 MERS brought a motion to

7

lift-stay in February 2008 as nominee for Quick Loan Funding. 36 Later, in July 2008, an amended

8

lift-stay motion was brought by GRP Loan in Moore. 37 Exhibit C to the amended motion shows

9

that an assignment of the deed of trust was made from MERS to GRP on February 27, 2007,

10

which pre-dates MERS' lift-stay motion. 38 Similarly, in Mercado, 39 a matter which was added to

11

the argument calendar after the order for joint briefing,40 MERS brought a motion to lift-stay as

12

nominee for MILA. 41 However, as seen in a later stipulation to sell the property, 42 Homecomings

13

Financial Network was the entity who was entitled to enforce the note.

14

In the remaining cases, MERS has attempted to establish its standing through the

15

affidavits of "Certifying Officials." Under the Membership Agreement, MERS provides

16

Members a corporate resolution designating one or more employees of the Member a MERS

17

Certifying Officer. This resolution, among other things, appoints the individual as an assistant

18
34

19

See also, Docket #74, Hultman Declaration at ,r 4.

20

35

Moore (#07-16333).

21

36

Docket #37 in Moore.

22

37

Docket #59 in Moore.

38

Docket #59, Exhibit C.

39

#07-17690.

40

Docket #44 in Mercado.

41

Docket #28 in Mercado.

42

Docket # 50, Exhibit 1 in Mercado.

23
24
25
26
27
28

10

1

secretary and vice president ofMERS. They are given the power to "take any and all actions and

2

execute all documents necessary to protect the interest of the Member, the beneficial owner of

3

such mortgage loan, or MERS in any bankruptcy proceeding regarding a loan registered on the

4

MERS System that is shown to be registered to the Member. 43 There appears to be absolutely no

5

requirement that these Certifying Officers have any knowledge of the loan in question. From the

6

MERS website it appears that the "Certifying Official" (the person who works for the holder of

7

the note) is not an employee of the servicer either. 44

8

In Hawkins the motion was brought by MERS "solely as nominee for Fremont Investment

9

& Loan, its successors and/or assigns." 45 However, in his affidavit at~ 6, Victor Parisi46 states

10

that the beneficial ownership interest in the Hawkins note was sold by Fremont Investment &

11

Loan and ownership was transferred by endorsement and delivery. While the affidavit goes on to

12

the say that MERS was a holder at the time the motion was filed, it is obvious that MERS has no

13

rights to bring the motion as nominee of Fremont given that Fremont no longer had any interest

14

in the note.

15

Similarly, in Ziegler47 the motion was brought by MERS "solely as nominee for Meridias

16

Capital, Inc., its successors and/or assigns." 48 Yet the affidavit of Stacey Kranz at~ 6 states that

17

"the beneficial ownership interest in the Zeigler Note was sold by Meridias and ownership was

18

transferred by endorsement and delivery. The Zeigler Note was subsequently endorsed in

19
20
21
22
23

43

Form Corporate Resolution, attached to Exhibit C to the Hultman Declaration, filed in
Dart, #08-11007.
44

The website says that "[a]fter your mortgage loan closed, your lender more than likely
outsourced the job of managing your loan to another company called a SERVICER. This is the
company you call when you have questions about your loan."

24
45

25
46

26
27
28

Docket #49, Exhibit C, and Docket #56, Exhibit A in Mitchell.

47

48

Docket #28 in #07-13593.

#08-10718.

#08-10718, Docket #21.
11

1

blank."49 An additional affidavit was filed by German Florez, the president of Meridias, who

2

disavowed "any interest in the Note and Deed of Trust regarding the Subject Property."50

3

A slightly different defect exists Dart. That motion was brought by MERS "solely as

4

nominee for Centralbanc Mortgage, its successors and/or assigns." 51 However, Ms. Mech, as

5

Certifying Officer, testifies that the note is held by Bank of America, who is listed as the current

6

servicer, and who "had (or has) physical possession of the note in its files." 52 In a previous

7

affidavit, Ms. Mech testified that "the beneficial mvnership interest in the Dart Note was sold by

8

Centralbanc and ownership was transferred by endorsement and delivery. The Dart 1\ote was

9

subsequently endorsed in blank."53

10

So while in each of these cases MERS may really be contending that is it entitled to

11

enforce the note in its own right through possession, or as the nominee of the transferee, the

12

motion was brought instead as nominee of an entity that no longer has any ownership interest in

13

the note.

14

Additionally, each motion has been brought in the name of the lender and "its successors

15

and/or assigns." Under FED. R. Crv. P. 17 an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real

16

party in interest. "As a general rule, a person who is an attorney-in-fact or an agent solely for the

17

purpose of bringing suit is viewed as a nominal rather than a real party in interest and will be

18

required to litigate in the name of his principal rather than in his own name." 6A CHARLES ALAN

19

WRIGHT &ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AKD PROCEDURE §1553 (2d ed. 1990). An

20

agent with ownership interest in the subject matter of the suit is a real party in interest. Id. There

21

is no evidence, however, of an agency relationship here or that MERS has any ownership interest

22
23

49

Docket #56, Exhibit C-1 in Mitchell.

50

Docket #56, Exhibit C-3 in Mitchell.

24
25
51

26
27
28

Docket #25 in Dart (#08-11007).

52

53

Docket #81-1 at~ 4 in }vfitchell.

Docket #49-1 at~ 6 in Mitchell.
12

1
2

making it the real party in interest under Rule 17.

OTHER EVIDENCE PROBLE~S
Even if the defects were ones of pure pleading, 54 the testimony in these cases is neither

3

4

competent nor admissible. Each of the affiants in the remaining cases testify as follows:
I have been appointed as Assistant Secretary of Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems., Inc. ("MERS") under a
Corporate Resolution that was executed on [date]. I make this
affidavit in support of Movant I have reviewed the loan file
relating to the above-referenced matter, and if called upon to testify
as to the facts set forth in this Affidavit, I could and would testify
competently based upon my review.

5
6
7

8
9

10

The affiant then purports to set forth the history of the negotiation and transfer of the note
and who now has possession. 55
First, this testimony is not admissible because there is no evidence that the affiants are

11
12

competent witnesses. The Federal Rules of Evidence apply in bankruptcy5 6 yet there is no

13

evidence that these Certifying Officers have adequate personal knowledge of the facts under FED.

14

R. Evrn. 602 ("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to

15

support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter."). 57

16
17
18
19

54

For example, Mr. Hultman has stated that a number of motions were withdrawn because
they identified MERS as the payee under the note. Hultman Declaration, Docket #74 in Mitchell.
55

For example Ms. Mech testifies in her affidavit (Docket# 81-1) that at the time MERS
filed the motion to lift stay in Dart:

20

Bank or America, who is listed as the current servicer on the Dart
(MIN: 100233602006080675) loan registered on the MERS System,
had (and has) physical possession of the original notes in its files.
MERS in turn has possession of those documents through a
MERS Certifying Officer who is an employee of the member
listed as servicer on the MERS System.

21
22
23
24
25

56

26

57

27
28

FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017.

Stacey Kranz, "an Assistant Secretary of [MERS] under a Corporate Resolution"
testifies in Zeigler (#08-10718) that "MERS was in physical possession of the Zeigler Note at the
time MERS filed the motion .... "(Docket #73 in Zeigler #08-10718). Mr. Victor Parsi, similarly
appointed, testifies in Hmvkins that "MERS was a holder of the Hawkins Note at the time the
13

1

2

Ms. Mech's bald assertion that she has "reviewed the loan file" is inadequate to show that
she is personally knowledgeable of the facts. Neither are the purported notes and deeds

3

admissible. For business records to be admissible as an exception from the hearsay rule under

4

FED. R. Evrn. 803(6) there must be a showing that the records were:

5

6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17

(1) made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge;
(2) made pursuant to a regular practice of the business activity;
(3) kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity; and
(4) the source, method, or circumstances of preparation must not indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
These elements must be established either by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness or must meet certification requirements. See In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437,
444 (B.A.P. 9 th Cir. 2005).

CONCLUSION
The lift-stay motions in Dart and Hawkins are denied. MERS may not enforce the
notes as the alleged beneficiary. While MERS may have standing to prosecute the motion in the
name of its Member as a nominee, there is no evidence that the named nominee is entitled to
enforce the note or that MERS is the agent of the note's holder. Indeed, the evidence is to the
contrary, the note has been sold, and the named nominee no longer has any interest in the note.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
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22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Motion for Relief was filed in MERS name .... "(Docket #56-2 filed in Mitchell.)
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